Capitalizing Modesty and Cult on Social Media

 Social media have been defined as a series of technological innovations in terms of both hardware and software that facilitate inexpensive content creation, interaction, and interoperability by online users. Social networks are “a web of personal or organizational action. General Pervez Musharraf expected a turn towards modernization by liberalizing Pakistan’s private electronic media in 2002. Yet the private electronic media continued to be a contributing factor in glorifying and encouraging many of the terrorists’ causes. The relationship between the media and terrorism/ political violence has been the subject of several studies.

 Before the further investigation, it is important to define what is meant by ‘private electronic media in the Pakistani context. High levels of illiteracy in much of the region lend television more significance in reaching the public than print or social media. Television channels, driven by the race for ‘ratings’, often sensationalize news and information that can inflame emotions. ‘Private Television’ does not necessarily mean independent television: journalists tend to remain mired in their own ideologies and nationalisms, particularly in conflict situations. Pakistani’s private media sector is also highly influenced by its ownership structures. There are four dominant media groups, which to some extent also have political affiliations. They are the Independent Media Corporation (popularly known as the Jang Group), the Waqt Group, the Pakistan Herald Publications (popularly known as the Dawn Group), and Express Group. Owing to their dominance in both print and broadcast industries, even though these groups are highly influential in politics, they cannot be held solely responsible for pervasive radicalization in the country. Anti- Americanism was the popular Sentiment, which was embraced by 86 private television channels competing with each other in the war of ratings. Analysis of new media and internet penetration in the country.
In Pakistan, the people were far more distrustful than the government of American intentions towards their country and the region. The widespread anti-US sentiment, which prevailed among the populace, ran especially deep among the residents of the two western provinces, Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. They scorned the Pakistani Government by siding with the US against their Afghan brothers. While the more moderate urban populations in Punjab and Sindh did not protest violently against America and Musharraf, they remained largely doubtful about the intentions of the US in neighboring Afghanistan. Mistrust for America was mainly based on the anti-Islam strands within US foreign policy and its past interferences in Pakistani politics. America was detested by the middle tier of urban society not just for supporting the dictatorships of General Ayyub, General Zia, and General Musharraf, but also for abandoning Pakistan after the first Afghan War. Many educated Pakistanis blamed themselves for siding with a superpower that had left their country with a big Afghan refugee population, imposed severe economic sanctions in the 1990s over the nuclear question, and openly preferred friendship with arch-rival India.
Influenced by Madrasah Wahabi ideology, the more marginalized and poorer sections of society shared a deep resentment towards America. According to America, along with Israel, was working ceaselessly towards the demise of Islam- and was therefore its biggest enemy. The main export market for Saudi Wahhabism was Pakistan, where over the years madrassahs and Islamic schools had been set up whose curriculum blended traditional Quranic study with radical Islamic politics. A major part of the madrassah curriculum included the fight for justice against the US.
The post-9/11 discussions emerging from Western newsrooms were overwhelmingly focused on the position of Muslims, a monolithic group, in relation to an equally monolithic ‘West’. CNN and the BBC were thought to be biased and were rejected by Pakistani audiences after 9/11. The state-controlled PTV, like Musharraf, was justifying the American invasion of Afghanistan. Playing to the public mood, the newly established private television channels started to give currency to orthodox religious ideas and perceptions, radicalizing Pakistani discourse. Consequently, people became more knowledgeable about religious and ideological issues, but this awareness was excessively biased in favor of Islam and hatred of the West, especially America. This was reinforced by a pan-Islamic wave of grievances following the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. As the Iraq invasion was opposed by all strata of Pakistani society, the television discourse reflected it by giving new supremacy to a clerical speaker. That discourse began to express cosmic grief that was a protest against global injustice, and regret Islam’s inability to dominate.
Al Qaeda’s official communications arm is called ‘As-Sahab’. This outlet specializes in issuing audio, video, and text-based statements from senior leaders, including Osama bin Laden, Ayman-al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Atiyah Abd al-Rahman. Al-Qaeda operatives based in Pakistan were largely non-Pakistani, yet they worked with and through networks of supportive Pakistani militant groups. From sanctuaries in the tribal areas and within key Pakistani cities, Al Qaeda had cultivated links within the various sections of the community. Despite their overwhelming disadvantage in military capabilities compared with the US and its allies, Al Qaeda proved itself a match in psychological warfare and information management. Enjoying considerable appeal in the Arabic and Islamic world, Osama bin Laden influenced the Taliban through his narrative combining geopolitics and deeply held religious beliefs. So while Osama bin Laden was using Al- Jazeera to broadcast his messages, the Taliban were effectively using the Pakistani media to put across their point of view. Trying to imitate stylistically the Western coverage of the post-9/11 war on terror, the Pakistani electronic media specifically exploited religion mixed with politics.
In the war on terror, the media continued to play a role of duplicity as Musharraf did. Rather it was critical of Musharraf’s cooperation with the west. First of all, the media rejected this war. The media thought that this was America’s war which is imposed on Pakistan and that Pakistan does not have any terrorist problems. They defined the terrorist as the national division factors; they even justified their terror tactics….. Even killing of women, children, and older people out of their hate for America.
Apart from having a savvy media cell, Al Qaeda had sent a brutal message to the world of journalism through the beheading of the Wall Street Journal’s Daniel Pearl in February 2002. The signal was simple and clear: anybody messing with our business will face serious torture leading to death.
On 21 February 2002, the horrifying videotape of Pearl’s murder was released. It did not show the faces of the murderers. The man who may have actually killed Pearl, or at least participated in the butchery, was Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Al- Qaeda’s number three. The murder was a particularly gruesome example of the many terrorist acts in Pakistan after 9/11. Pearl’s murder is one of the most horrifying examples of a savage attack on a defenseless journalist in the world of conflict reporting. Through the savage video of Pearl’s death, Al- Qaeda killed two birds with one stone. It created a story that yet again unfortunately enjoyed international impact and at the same time, it petrified the journalistic Community. In South Waziristan, Nek Mohammad allegedly provided a safe haven and training camps for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and to fighters from Chechnya and other conflicts. Some members of his group were associated with Jundullah, a militant anti-Iranian organization, and its media studio Ummat was allegedly connected with Al- Qaeda’s media front organization, the Al Sahab Foundation. Both produced anti-Western and anti-government videos. Maulana Fazlullah took control of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM), which had support in the Malakand division (including the districts of Buner, Chitral, Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Malakand, Shangla and Swat). Maulana Fazlullah was nicknamed ‘Mullah Radio’ for his existing use of FM radio to promote his vitriolic views in the Swat valley against polio vaccination and girl’s education and established a parallel system of government (Samad, 2011, p. 161).
“Modesty” is not a four-letter word. With the recent petition from a 15-year-old girl pleading with retailers to offer more modest AND fashionable clothing options to actress Mayim Bialik’s powerful article in GrokNation on her views of modesty- the topic is certainly compelling, evoking the interest and emotions of many. Over the summer, the topic of women, their bodies, modest swimwear, and feminism all came to the fore on the front page of the Wall Street Journal. Featuring Hydro Chic as well as other modest swimwear brands, reporter Lucette Lagnado piqued the interest of many WSJ readers with a discussion of modest swimwear as an industry and why it appeals to a variety of individuals, from women with religious constraints to both missy and plus-size women who just want to feel more comfortable in the pool. It was an honor to be featured in the article, but the piece also made us think long and hard about the greater meaning of modest swimwear and its impact on society today. 
 While the article received a lot of positive feedback, the featured pictures of women in modest bathing suits sparked much fiery discussion in the comments section. Prompting some to argue that these bathing suits are anti-feminine and misogynist. After all, Hollywood and mainstream media scream the popular phrase,” If you’ve got it, flaunt it!” and assert that people who are proud of their bodies should show it off to the world unabashedly. We fully support various expressions of feminity, which is why such a torrent of this type of feedback was so surprising. For Hydro Chic, modest swimwear is not a push to return to medieval-inspired attire. Rather, modest swimwear is about the power of choice, a tenet that all feminists believe in at its core.
 In this complex arena of a propaganda war, investigative journalism in Pakistan became a game of Russian roulette. Journalists were squeezed from every side, threatened by the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the ISI, the MQM, the Zardari loyalists, and a host of other state and non-state actors. A grisly example of journalists being caught up in the middle is the recent story of Saleem Shehzad, a Pakistani reporter for Asia Times Online, who covered the Taliban more closely than any other journalists in the region, and who reported on Al- Qaeda infiltration into the Pakistani Navy. Shehzad went missing in May 2011 and  Was found dead a few days later, his body showing signs of torture. Shehzad’s murderers have never been found. Many in media circles might suspect that one or another organization is responsible for his brutal murder, yet choose to keep quiet for their own safety. Each seems to be signaling to the other through the mass media.

Some WSJ readers saw past the political rhetoric and understood how modest swimwear offers a positive message of female choice to the modern world. While she would not wear this type of swimwear herself, commenter Laura Little wrote: “Choice is great. There are plenty of reasons to cover up more on the beach- modesty, comfort, skin protection, sports, what have you. That’s a women’s personal business- not yours……., I am happy to see they are made women, by women”.